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CASE COMMENTS
dinary income into capital gain, as well as the taxpayer's problem of
obtaining a depreciation deduction against ordinary income.60
JEROME TURNER
CRIMINAL ASSAULTS IN NONFATAL AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS
The common law recognizes -that the automobile driver who causes
death by his criminal negligence is guilty of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter.1 The common law, however, did not develop a sepa-
rate and distinct crime to cover the situation where only injury, and
not death, is the result of the driver's criminal negligence. To fill this
gap, it has been necessary to expand the coverage of the crime of as-
sault and battery, in effect creating a crime of negligent assault and
battery.2 Assault and battery is both a crime and a tort. In torts
it is strictly limited to intentional wrongs.3 This has led to efforts
to limit the crime, also, to intentional wrongs. To do so, though, is to
overlook the fact that torts has a separate action to cover negligent
injuries.4 In criminal law, either a crime with a new name must be
created or the coverage of an old one expanded, unless an area of
social harm is to go unpunished.
The confusion that has resulted is particularly evident where ag-
"Cases on point decided after Macabe Co. are listed below. Bell Lines, Inc.,
43 T.C. 358 (1964); Nichols, 42 T.C. 135 (1964); Smith Leasing Co., Inc., 43 T.C.
37 (1961); Frotz, 43 T.C. 127 (1964); Juniper Investment Co., CCH 1964-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9848 (1964); Adams, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 1964-3o5 (1964); Moses
Lake Homes, Inc., P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 1964-289 (1964).
'E.g., State v. Barnett, 218 S.C. 415, 63 S.E.2d 57 (1951); Keller v. State, 155
Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803 (1927); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, s89 Va. 862, 55 S.E.2d 24
(1949).
An automobile owner who was at home when the accident occurred, was guilty
of a misdemeanor for giving his car keys to a drunken driver, but he was not a prin-
cipal to the accident and therefore was not guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
People v. Marshall, 362 Mich. 17o, io6 N.V.2d 842 (1961).
2"[T]here seems to be no good reason to doubt that a person may be quilty of
criminal assault and battery if he intentionally does an act which, by reason of its
wanton and grossly negligent character, exposes another to personal injury, and does
in fact cause such injury." Clark & Marshall, Law of Crimes § 198 (4th ed. 194o).
Convictions of assault and battery by reckless driving were reported as early as 1916.
Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S.E. 41 (1916); State v. Schutte, 88 ,NJ.L. 396,
96 AtI. 659 (Ct. Err. &; App. 1916).
2See Restatement, Torts § 13 (1934)-
'Negligence, which emerged out of the action on the case, has been recognized
since about 1825 as a separate basis of tort liability. Prosser, Torts § 28 (3 d ed. 1964).
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gravated assaults are involved, as is illustrated by the recent case of
State v. Balderrama.5 The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed a con-
viction for assault with a deadly weapon where the instrumentality
was an automobile, operated with criminal negligence. The defendant
was drunk and driving at an improper speed when his automobile
struck and injured a ten-year old boy. Balderrama was convicted
and sentenced to from two to five years in the state prison. On ap-
peal, the state relied for affirmance on the court's 1927 decision of
Brimhall v. State,0 in which the court held that a conviction of aggra-
vated assault could be sustained upon proof of driving with criminal
negligence7
The Supreme Court of Arizona in Balderrama overruled Brimhall
v State, holding that to convict of aggravated assault requires proof
of an actual intent to commit an injury. The court rejected the authori-
ties based on manslaughter convictionss or decided in states holding
automobiles generally to be "dangerous instrumentalities." 9
597 Ariz. 134, 397 P.2d 632 (1964).
131 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927).
7Ibid. The defendant drove an automobile at a reckless speed at night, with-
out headlights, on the wrong side of the road in violation of the law, and while
so doing struck and severely injured another person. The defendant was convicted
under § 215 of the 1913 penal code, which is now Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13 -24 5 (A)( 5)
(1956): "An assault or battery is aggravated when committed under any of the fol-
lowing circumstances: (5) When a serious bodily injury is inflicted upon the person
assaulted." In deciding this case of first impression, the court in Brimhall relied
primarily on cases where convictions for manslaughter were sustained when death
was caused by a driver's recklessness, rather than intentional conduct. E.g., People
v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N.E. 398 (1917).
The court concluded that one is not criminally liable for ordinary negligence,
but where an injury is the result of reckless and wanton conduct, the law imputes
to the wrongdoer a willful and malicious intention.
8In State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828 (1922), it was assumed that
the same facts in a homicide case that constituted a conviction of manslaughter
would make out a crime of assault if death had not resulted. The Arizona court
rejected this rule on the ground that historically manslaughter has always covered
"unintentional" homicide. State v. Balderrama, supra note 5, at 635.
In a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter as a result of negligent driving,
it has been held that the refusal of an instruction that the defendant might be
found guilty of assault was not error since neither assault nor assault and battery
is necessarily included in the offense of manslaughter. Blackburn v. State, 203 Ind.
332, x8o N.E. 18o (1932). Contra, State v. Dean, 32 Del. 29o, 122 At. 448 (1923)-
"Williamson v. State, 92 Fla. 98o, iii So. 124, 126 (1926); Beck v. State, 73 Okla.
Crim. 229, 19 P.-2d 865, 870 (1941). In Florida, an automobile is not dangerous per
se. Any automobile operated upon a public highway, however, is a dangerous instru-
mentality. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 8o Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 632 (1920).
In a majority of states, an automobile only becomes a dangerous instrumentality,
so as to impose civil liability, when it is in the control of a careless or reckless
operator. E.g., Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 17o Atl. 532, 536 (1934); Slaughter
v. Holsomback, 166 Miss. 643, 147 So. 318, 322 (1933); Moore v. Roddie, 1o6 Wash.
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The crime of negligent assault and battery with an automobile is
based upon conduct that is criminally negligent with reference to the
person injured. In sustaining convictions for this offense, courts fre-
quently use an unnecessary fiction of imputing a criminal intent from
the driver's criminal negligence.' 0 Sometimes this is phrased in terms
of criminal negligence being the equivalent of intent," and at other
times the defendant is said to have intended the natural consequences
of his reckless conduct.' 2 These rationales indicate that many courts
have failed to distinguish the crime of assault and battery from the
strictly intentional wrong in torts. In criminal law, absent statute, 13
any punishable application of force to the person of another may
constitute an assault and battery.14 The rule is now established that
a conviction of this crime may be supported by harm to the per-
son resulting from criminal negligence. 15 In prosecutions for negligent
assault and battery with an automobile, therefore, a showing of crim-
inal negligence with reference to the person injured16 should be suf-
548, i8o Pac. 879 (1919). See cases collected at Annot., 16 A.L.R. 270 (1922). In some
states, the "modern automobile is a dangerous instrumentality even in the hands
of a most careful and prudent operator." Tyndall v. Rippon, 44 Del. 458, 61 A.2d
422, 424 (1948). Accord, People v. Chatham, 43 Cal. App. 2d 298, 11o P.2d 704
(1941); Marsh v. O'Flaherty, 319 Ill. App. 250, 48 N.E.2d 8o6 (1943). At early law,
a trolley car was held to be "a machine of a highly dangerous character." New
Jersey Traction Co. v. Danbech, 57 N.J.L. 463, 31 At. 1o38, 1039 (1895).
'"E.g., State v. Hamburg, 34 Del. 62, 143 Atl. 47 (1928).
"State v. Hamburg, supra note io; Lyons v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 657, 197
S.W. 387 (1917); Woodward v. State, 164 Miss 468, 144 So. 895 (1932); Davis v.
Commonwealth, 150 Va. 611, 143 S.E. 641 (1928).
' 1Bleiweiss v. State, 188 Ind. 184, 122 N.E. 577 (1919).
"An occasional statute requires intent to cause bodily harm to constitute a
battery. Wis. Stat. § 94o.2o (1963).
"Perkins, Criminal Law 85 (1957).
"Ibid. For criminal guilt, negligence must supply the mens rea. State v. Strobel,
130 Mont. 442, 304 P.2d. 6o6 (1956). The terms "gross," "criminal," and "culpable"
negligence are used by different courts to show that a higher degree of negligence
is required to impose criminal guilt than that required to establish ordinary negli-
gence which is sufficient to impose civil liability. Perkins, Criminal Law 667 (1957).
E.g., People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 285 P.2d 926 (1955); People v. Dawson, 206
Misc. 297, 133 N.Y.S.2d 423, 427 (1954).
Texas is an exception to this rule. Criminal negligence for the statutory of-
fenses of negligent homicide and aggravated assault with a motor vehicle is a lack
of the degree of care and caution that a man of ordinary prudence would use
under like circumstances. Tex. Pen. Code arts. 1149, 1230-1233 (1948).
'(A driver may be guilty of criminal assault when he injuries a person who is
a pedestrian or an occupant of another vehicle. Cases cited supra note 2. In Texas,
the statutory offense of aggravated assault with a motor vehicle includes any driver
who wilfully or negligently collides with or causes injury less than death to any
other person. Tex. Pen. Code art. 1149 (1948). This statute has been construed as
meaning that a collision has to be made with the person injured. A negligent
driver, therefore, who runs into a utility pole does not commit an aggravated as-
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ficient to uphold a conviction. There is no necessity for supplying the
driver with a criminal intent.
Aggravated assaults are generally statutory crimes. 17 Some statutes
define the offense as assault with an intent to inflict great bodily in-
jury.18 Under these statutes, it is clear that criminal negligence alone
will not support a conviction. The specific intent to inflict harm must
be proved.19 It has been held that a last moment abandonment of
this intent will not absolve the driver's guilt for consequences of force
that he has set in motion.
2 0
Most statutes defining aggravated assault are open to interpreta-
tion as to whether an element of specific intent is required. 21 The
statute in the Balderrama case is typical: "A person who commits an
assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instru-
ment, or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily in-
jury .... -22 The Supreme Court of Arizona read a specific intent into
this statute, apparently defining "assault" as strictly an intentional
crime.
Courts that have construed aggravated assault statutes similar to
that of Arizona have generally held that driving with criminal neg-
ligence will support a conviction. Some courts have assumed a sta-
tutory element of intent, and supported their convictions by imput-
ing the required' intent from the driver's criminal negligence.23 Other
sault upon his own passenger, Jones v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 451, 286 S.W.2d 427
(1956); nor does he commit an assault when his negligence causes a frightened pas-
senger to jump from another vehicle. McDuffy v. State, 151 Tex. Grim. 2o3, 206
S.W.2d 6ol (1947).
'Mhe term "aggravated assault" is used to include the crimes of aggravated
assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to murder. The
offense of aggravated assault was not known at common law. An assault that would
have resulted in murder, mayhem, rape, or robbery if successful, was prosecuted
as an attempt to commit the felony. See Saunders v. State, 148 Miss. 425, 114 So. 747
(1927). Some jurisdictions provide for aggravated assault by degrees of assault. E.g.,
N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 240-245.
"E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 694.6 (195o).
"E.g., State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162 N.W. 28 (1917). A conviction was
upheld where the defendant made two attempts with his automobile to knock a
policeman down. State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d 604 (ig5o). In Piatkow-
ski v. State, 43 Misc. 2d 424, 251 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Ct. Cl. 1964), reckless driving was
not sufficient to show a willful intent under the statutory felony of assault in
the second degree. The driver had been chased at speeds from seventy to ninety
miles per hour, and was driving on the wrong side of the road, before colliding
with a pursuing police car.
"'See People v. Claborn, 36 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
"'E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-249 (1956); Cal. Pen. Code § 245.
!Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-249 (1956).
uState v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 86 S.E.2d 774 (1955); State v. Agnew, 202 N.C.
755, 164 S.E. 578, 580 (1932); Matin v. State, 333 P.2d 585 (Okla. Grim. App. 1958).
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courts have based their decisions on an analogy to involuntary man-
slaughter convictions. 24 Brimhall v. State25 was in accord with these
decisions. In that case, the Arizona court concluded that courts un-
hesitatingly convict for involuntary manslaughter when a driver's
reckless rather than intentional conduct causes death. When only
injury results, "we see no good reason why he [the criminally negli-
gent driver] may not be held for the lessor offense of aggravated as-
sault."26
Courts that have convicted drivers under aggravated assault statutes
by inferring criminal intent, and the court in Balderrama which re-
jected this practice, are alike in failing to recognize a crime of negli-
gent assault and battery. The majority of cases have interpreted ag-
gravated assault statutes so as to impose punishment on the driver
who causes injury by his criminal negligence. 27 The Texas legislature
has solved this problem by enacting a statute specifically concerned
with aggravated assault with a motor vehicle.28 To convict under this
statute requires only a showing of ordinary negligence. 29
In the jurisdictions that have prosecuted criminally negligent
drivers for assault with a deadly weapon, the question frequently
arises whether an automobile is a "deadly weapon" within the mean-
ing of the statute. A majority of jurisdictions that have ruled on the
question hold that an automobile may become a deadly weapon when
it is operated30 in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily
-
1State v. Carlson, 325 Mo. 689, 29 S.W.2d 135 (1930).
131 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927).
-Ibid. at 167.
-State v. Carlson, 325 Mo. 698, 29 S.W.2d 135 (1930); State v. Eason, 242 N.C.
59, 86 S.E.2d 774 (ig5); State v. Agnew, 202 N.C. 755, 164 S.E. 578 (1932); Matin v.
State, 333 P.-d 585 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958); WVinkler v. State, 45 Okla. Crim. 322,
283 Pac. 591 (1929).
"Tex. Pen. Code art. 1149 (1948).
-McCollum v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 158, 346 S.W.2d 126 (1961); Merryman v.
State, 153 Tex. Crim. 593, 223 S.W.2d 63o (1949). A conviction under this statute
was reversed where the defendant's failure to stop at a stop sign resulted in an-
other vehicle striking him. The court held that the defendant could not be guilty
of an assault if the other vehicle hit him, notwithstanding that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Fannin v. State, 168 Tex.
Crim. 593, 331 S.W.2d 47 (196o).
3The word "operate" is a broad term, including most acts incidental to move-
ment as well as the actual movement of the vehicle. The meaning of "operate" is
significant in prosecuting under drunken driving statutes. Starting the engine is
usually sufficient to constitute the offense. State v. Ray, 4 N.J. Misc. 493, 133 Atl.
486 (1926). Steering a car which is being towed was held to be operating the vehicle.
State v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 15o At. 68 (1935). Similarly, shifting a gear and allow-
ing the vehicle to roll a short distance is operating. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 254
Mass. 566, 15o N.E. 829 (1926).
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harm.31 The question is then determined from the evidence whether
the defendant was operating the vehicle in such a manner at the time
of the accident.
Negligent drivers who cause nonfatal injuries have occasionally
been indicted for the crime of assault with an intent to murder. This
offense generally requires proof of a specific intent to kill.32 Georgia,
which is the only state with a significant number of prosecutions
against motorists for this offense, requires malice and a specific in-
tent to kill to constitute the crime. 33 In sustaining convictions of
motorists, however, the Georgia courts have held that malice may be
presumed from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to pro-
duce death,3 4 and certain wanton and reckless states of mind can
be treated by the jury as sufficient proof of a specific intent to kill.3a
In most cases, the facts that have convicted a driver of an assault
offense would have also been sufficient to support a conviction for
at least one motor vehicle violation. A comparison of statutory pun-
ishments reveals in some states a considerably more lenient penalty
for motor vehicle violations than for assault offenses.30 It is apparent
that the courts in these states must frequently extend the coverage
of criminal assault statutes rather than exclude a criminally negligent
driver from the punishment that public policy demands.
There is no doubt that a person who inflicts bodily injury by oper-
'1The law recognizes as a deadly weapon anything with which death can be
easily and readily produced. Acres v. United States, 164 U.S. 388 (1896). This includes
an automobile when it is operated in a manner likely to produce death or great
bodily harm. People v. Clink, 216 111. App. 357 (1920).
'Bowen v. State, 32 Ala. App. 357, 26 So. 2d 205 (1946); Bennett v. State, i8o Ga.
App. 881, 134 S.E.2d 847 (1964); Davis v. State, 76 Ga. App. 860, 47 S.E.2d 670
(1948); State v. Buchanan, 73 Idaho 365, 252 P.0d 524 (1935); People v. Coolidge, 26
Ill. d 533, 187 N.E.2d 694 (1963).
3Easley v. State, 49 Ga. App. 275, 175 S.E. 23 (1934).
-nIbid.
2"Ibid. Webb v. State, 68 Ga. App. 466, 23 S.E.2d 578 (1942); Chambliss v. State,
37 Ga. App. 124, 139 S.E. 8o (1927).
-In California, reckless driving that proximately causes bodily injury carries
a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a fine of five hundred dollars. Cal.
Vehicle Code § 231o4. The maximum penalty for assault with a deadly weapon is
ten years in the state penitentiary and a fine of five thousand dollars. Cal. Pen. Code
§ 245.
In the Balderrama case, the defendant drove an automobile while intoxicated
and at an improper speed for the existing conditions. The maximum penalty that
could have been imposed for the combined effenses of reckless driving and driving
while intoxicated would have been nine months imprisonment in the county jail
and a fine of six hundred dollars. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-692, 28-692.01, 28-
693 (Supp. 1964). A conviction of assault with a deadly weapon in Arizona carries
a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment in the state prison and a fine of five
thousand dollars. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-249 (1956).
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ating an automobile with an utter disregard of human safety deserves
a most severe penalty. In view of the numerous nonfatal automobile
accidents, the legislatures might declare that if any injury short of
death is inflicted by a driver's criminal negligence, it shall, without
reference to intent, constitute criminal assault with an automobile.
It is submitted that until such legislation is enacted, the policy of
extending the coverage of criminal assault offenses must be continued.
The Balderrama decision rejected the practice of convicting drivers
under assault statutes that were enacted before the invention of the
automobile.3 7 The Supreme Court of Arizona correctly suggested an
existing gap in motor vehicle legislation; but it failed to consider that
criminal statutes must be interpreted so as to help suppress crime and
protect society.38 The court's reasoning is hardly sufficient for reading
criminal intent into Arizona's assault with a deadly weapon statute,
apparently ignoring a crime of negligent assault and battery, and
thereby failing to provide an appropriate punishment for a serious
offense.
RAYMOND H. VIZETHANN, JR.
Many courts have been compelled to turn to penal statutes that were en-
acted before the invention of the automobile. The Oklahoma statute for assault
with a dangerous weapon was enacted in 189o. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 645 (196i).
A defense on the ground that the legislature could not possibly have intended to
include automobiles within this statute was rejected in Beck v. State, 73 Okla.
Crim. 229, 119 P.2d 865, 867 (1941).
The Arizona assault with a deadly weapon statute was enacted in 19oi. See
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-249. Arizona's statute is derived from the California
assualt with a deadly weapon statute, which was enacted in 1872. Cal. Pen. Code §
245.
'In Oklahoma, the maximum penalty for assault with a deadly weapon is
five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 645 (1961).
In two cases where a defendant's drunken and reckless driving resulted in serious
bodily injury to others, the Oklahoma courts applied the assault statute rather
than prosecute under the applicable misdemeanor motor vehicle statutes. In Lott
v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. 324, 223 P.2d 147 (195o), the defendant was sentenced to
eighteen months in the state penitentiary. In convicting under the assault with a
deadly weapon statute, the court stated that penal laws are not enacted for the
protection of criminals. The court concluded that the defendant could be properly
prosecuted and punished under the assault statute since it is the duty of the courts
to construe penal laws so as to suppress crime and protect society.
In Beck v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 229, 119 P.2d 865 (1941), the defendant was
sentenced to three years and six months in the state penitentiary. This sentence
was held not to be excessive since the defendant had been a persistent law violator.
